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Abstract 
In this thesis, we examine how multinational enterprises strategically allocate their patents in order 
to reduce the consolidated tax burdens. It is crucial to acknowledge the importance of patents in 
profit shifting, because it concerns a considerable proportion of lost revenues for European 
countries. These types of profit shifting strategies have been studied by several researchers 
previously, but many of them have lost their topicality. Patent box regimes and changes in statutory 
income tax rates have changed the tax regulatory environment in Europe substantially. However, 
the effect of these recent changes has received little attention by academics. This thesis aims to fill 
this academic gap by providing empirical results from a dataset that has a high degree of recency, 
which thus includes relevant tax deductions from implemented patent boxes. In order to investigate 
how patents are being used in profit shifting activities, we have adopted the empirical approach 
from Karkinsky & Riedel (2012).  Furthermore, to provide a basis of empirical evidence of profit 
shifting, we have used a model based on the methodological approach from Böhm, Karkinsky, 
Knoll, & Riedel (2015). This is a logistic model that estimates the probability of the patent inventor 
and the patent applicant being geographically separated. By doing so, we provide empirical results 
that will contribute to strengthening the validity of our main analysis. In the last part of this thesis, 
we investigate whether high- or low-quality patents are predominantly used in profit shifting 
activities. Hence, this thesis aims to help tax authorities identifying which patents are more likely 
to be used in profit shifting activities. Finally, the associated semi-elasticities will be calculated in 
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International differences in statutory income tax rates enables multinational enterprises (hereafter 
MNEs) to develop favourable tax planning strategies and cause a yearly loss of tax revenues 
around 650 billion dollars (Crivelli, De Mooij, & Keen, 2016). MNEs can exploit international tax 
variations by using different mechanisms by shifting their profits to countries with favourable 
corporate income tax rates. MNEs may engage in profit shifting activities through e.g., transfer 
price manipulation, intra-company debt, or strategic location of intangible assets. Tax planning 
activities among MNEs have been greatly debated, and several studies on this topic highlight how 
severe the economic consequences are. The discrepancy emerges because governments lose a 
substantial proportion of their tax revenues, whilst many MNEs consider these activities to be both 
legal and necessary in order to maintain competitive.  
For this thesis, we investigate if, and to what extent, patents are being used in profit shifting 
activities. Previous studies have given evidence of the extent of which patents are being used as 
instruments to minimize the consolidated tax burdens. Many acclaimed companies such as 
Microsoft1, Apple2 and Starbucks Corporation3 have been under accusation of using patent-
shifting mechanisms in order to avoid taxes. Significant corporate income tax revenues are lost 
because MNEs chose to apply for their patents in countries where the tax rates are low. By doing 
so, affiliates can exaggerate the transfer price on licensing the usage of the patents to other 
affiliates, and thus reduce the profits of the subsidiaries located in high tax countries. Basing the 
thesis on the empirical approach proposed by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Böhm et al. (2015), 
we provide empirical evidence that MNEs are still using patents as instruments in profit shifting 
activities. Furthermore, this thesis elaborates on whether high or low-quality patents are primarily 
being used in tax planning activities and will provide the associated semi-elasticities for the 
different quality patents.  
 
1 See (Hickey, 2013), available at https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-microsoft-avoids-taxes-
loopholes-irs-2013-1?r=US&IR=T  
2 See (Gleckman, 2013), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/05/21/the-real-story-
about-apples-tax-avoidance-how-ordinary-it-is/  
3 See (The Economist, 2012), available at https://www.economist.com/business/2012/12/15/wake-up-and-
smell-the-coffee  
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An overarching approach in this thesis has been to produce results that are valid and insightful in 
the economic and tax regulatory environment in Europe today. In recent years, several European 
countries have introduced patent box regimes, which incentivizes patent applications. To account 
for this and provide an analysis with a high degree of topicality, the recency of the time period has 
been particularly accentuated. A combination between availability of data, and an overall aim to 
obtain a high degree of topicality, has resulted in a thesis that includes observations from 2011 to 
2017.  
The data sample consists of companies from the EU-274, in addition to Norway, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. The most imperative reason for choosing these countries comes from the 
availability of data concerning European intangible assets. Professor Juranek at NHH provided us 
with the data basis, which has been further complemented with data from the European Patent 
Office and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter EPO and 
OECD). Even though our thesis excludes non-European countries, the remaining still represents a 
high number compared to previous literature. If there is adequate affiliate specific data available 
from a country, we see no reason why they should not be included.  
During the early 2000s, governments raised concerns regarding the increasing relocation of 
valuable intangible property to low-tax economies (Hejazi, 2006, p. 399). As a result, 
policymakers implemented different strategies to limit the magnitude of profit shifting, e.g., 
through the introduction of strict transfer pricing regulations, controlled foreign corporation rules 
(CFC), and thin capitalization rules. The most notable of these that are mentioned in previous 
literature is the CFC-rules. Our thesis does not account for this as they are abolished by the EU. 
Instead, we include the intellectual property box regimes that some argue is a direct consequence 
from the abolishment of CFC rules (Bräutigam, Spengel, & Streif, 2015, p. 3). 
The average statutory corporate income tax rates (hereafter CIT rates) have steadily been 
declining. According to the OECD, the European CIT rates have been falling from 48.5% in 1985 
to 24.18% in 2017 (Alstadsæter, Barrios, Nicodeme, Skonieczna, & Vezzani, 2018, p. 136). The 
general decrease in CIT rates ultimately results in smaller tax differences between European 
 
4 There were not adequate data from Lithuania to perform the desired analysis, which is why this country 
has been removed. Only 26 of the 27 of the EU countries are therefore included.  
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countries. This in turn means that interconnected tax planning prospects might not be as profitable 
as they previously were. However, because of the introduction of multiple patent box regimes, the 
effective tax differences on income generated by patents in Europe has endured. There is moderate 
empirical evidence on the significance of patent box regimes on research and development 
(hereafter R&D) and strategic patent location. Several studies have given evidence of a negative 
connection between the corporate income tax rates and affiliates’ amount of intangible assets (see 
e.g., Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Böhm 
et al. (2014), Ernst et al. (2014), or Griffith et al. (2014)), but few include the impact of patent box 
regimes. This is partly due to the somewhat outdated data used in previous studies, where only a 
limited number of countries had actually implemented patent boxes.  
In recent years, patent box regimes have been implemented in several European countries, which 
substantially increases the differences in taxes applicable to income generated by patent royalties. 
In order for our thesis to reflect these differences, it is crucial to include patent boxes and their 
associated tax deductions. The regimes have been implemented to stimulate and attract R&D 
investments and will potentially have great impact on location of patents. There are no European 
regulations that determine how tax deductions from patent boxes are calculated (EY, 2020). Some 
deductions are a percentage of the statutory corporate income tax, others have a flat tax on all 
income received from patents. The difference between CIT rates and tax deductions from patent 
box regimes vary substantially. The effective reduction in taxes differ from 35% in Malta, to 4.5% 
in Hungary5. We suspect that the introduction of patent boxes has considerably changed the way 
MNEs carries out their tax planning activities.  
Several studies point out that the arm’s length price of intra-firm transfers of intangibles is 
challenging to observe and determine (Choi, Ishikawa, & Okoshi, 2020). As a result, MNEs have 
an incentive to shift profits from subsidiaries in high-tax economies to intangible-holding-affiliates 
in low-tax economies by exaggerating the actual arm’s length prices of royalties and licenses. 
Furthermore, there are no viable source where we can observe relocations of patents within 
multinational enterprises after the application process. Hence, some of the methods of unveiling 
possible tax planning activities are not accessible. However, we can observe a strong suggestive 
 
5 See appendix, table D for overview of patent box countries and their associated tax deductions form 
patent boxes. 
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indicator of profit shifting if the inventor of a patent is located in a different location than where 
the MNE carries out the patent application. The inventor of a patent does not necessarily have to 
be its legal owner, and thus the entirety of the application process can be done by an affiliate 
located in a different country. This in turn enables affiliates that are part of an MNE to strategically 
locate the patent in a country with favourable tax deductions, or where the CIT rate is lower 
compared to the inventor country. Böhm et al. (2015) claims that this is one of the most common 
patent related strategies MNEs engage in to shift profits. For this reason, their methodology will 
be used as a point of departure for giving empirical evidence of profit shifting in our data sample.   
In order to add valuable results to existing literature, we have added an extension of our model by 
separating high- and low-quality patents. The first patent applications at the EPO dates back to 
1978, and since then there have been a wide array of suggestions for determining the quality of a 
patent. It is not straight forward to determine whether a patent is high- or low-quality, and different 
fields of studies recognizes contrasting characteristics. For engineers, a high-quality patent is likely 
to be a patent with a clearly described content that secures a major invention, instead of an 
incremental advance in technology. On the other hand, economists might argue that a patent is 
recognized as high-quality if it achieves the key objectives of the patent system. This can for 
instance be to incentivize or reward, while also facilitating further technological development, and 
thus economic growth. Legal scholars conversely often value a patent’s quality by its capability to 
endure a legal test without being discredited. Due to the nature of patents and their ability to cover 
a variety of fields, a general quality indicator must therefore cover a multitude of aspects. 
In order to determine a patent’s quality, we have adopted a quality indicator that has been 
comprised by Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo (2013) from the department of science, 
technology and industry at OECD (hereafter STI). Choosing the indicators that have been 
developed by STI is applicable for several reasons. The calculations of the quality indicators are 
built on extensive literature, it relies on information from the relevant patent application form and 
are calculated on patent cohort.6 The cohorts are based on a combination of the year of filing and 
the technology field. By doing so, the calculation of the quality indicator will account for potential 
technology- and time-related shocks. After deciding a suitable quality indicator, it is important to 
 
6 For further discussion about patent quality, see Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo (2021). 
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determine a threshold where a patent can be characterized as a high-quality patent. The quality 
indicator provided by STI only provides a number, and we have to decide which percentile that 
adequately represents a high-quality patent. The threshold might be debatable, which is why we 
have set up three different thresholds in order to analyse the elasticities at three different 
percentiles7.  
We will analyse profit shifting mechanisms in the same manner that has been done by previous 
studies. In order to make the results viable in the economic and tax regulatory environment in 
Europe today, the degree of recency in the time sample is high. Furthermore, we will take the 
analysis a step further by separating low- and high-quality patents and provide their respective 
elasticities. Thus, the research question for this thesis is:  
 
Do multinational enterprises strategically locate patents in order to shift profits and reduce the 
consolidated tax burdens, and are high- or low-quality patents predominantly used in these 
strategies? 
 
This thesis provides further insights and contributes to previous literature in multiple ways. Firstly, 
the current published articles concerning patents and profit shifting have somewhat lost their 
topicality, due to large changes in tax policies in recent times (see e.g., Dischinger and Riedel 
(2011), Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Böhm et al. (2014), Ernst et al. 
(2014), or Griffith et al. (2014)). Some of the largest changes in corporate income tax rates have 
occurred in recent times. Simultaneously, the initiation of patent box regimes in several countries 
in Europe has sparked a new method for MNEs to strategically engage in tax planning activities. 
To our knowledge, the only literature that estimates the effects of relevant patent box regimes has 
been conducted by Alstadsæter et al. (2018). We compliment this literature by utilizing a time 
sample from 2011 – 2017, whereas theirs is from 2000 – 2012. This thesis thus comprehends newly 
introduced patent box regimes that have been implemented post 2012.   
Furthermore, we include a more comprehensive number of European countries than previous 
studies (see e.g., Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Böhm et al. (2014), or 
 
7 For further explanation about quality indicator thresholds, see section 4. 
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Griffith et al. (2014))8. Excluding countries with beneficial tax regimes, and thus a high likelihood 
of being used for tax avoidance activities, might be a source of disruption to the results. Moreover, 
by including more countries, our dataset also provides a larger number of affiliates. The inclusion 
of these affiliates increases the probability of capturing important profit shifting activities that are 
being done in Europe.  
Previous literature has primarily focused on intangible assets in general, whereas this thesis will 
study what type of patents that are predominantly used for tax planning activities. As formerly 
stated, we will investigate whether high- or low-quality patents are being used as a mean to avoid 
taxes. By doing so, this thesis will provide an understanding to whether a large number of low-
quality patents, or a small number of high-quality are most frequently used in profit shifting 
activities. The analysis we provide thereby further relates to Alstadsæter et al. (2018), who also 
separate patents by their quality.  
To prove that patents are being used for profit shifting, previous studies have mainly aimed 
attention to the number of patent applications per affiliate, and how sensitive the number of patent 
applications are to differences in European taxes. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) use the number of 
patent applications as their dependent variable throughout their studies, and similar research has 
not introduced significant varieties to the dependent variable (see e.g., Griffith et al. 2014, Dudar 
& Voget, (2015)). By doing so, the results will primarily be indicative, and not necessarily give 
more than anecdotal evidence of profit shifting. Countries with handsome tax deductions on 
income generated from patents will naturally attract R&D investors, and thus it is expected to see 
a growth in patent applications. This evidently means that there are complications when 
ascertaining the results as empirical evidence of profit shifting. 
In order to cope with these complications, we will implement a similar model to the one proposed 
by Böhm et al. (2014, p.12). In order to evidence profit shifting in European countries, they 
examine how the location of the patent applicant and patent inventor is geographically separated. 
Specifically, the model studies the probability of a patent inventor being in a different country than 
where the patent is applied for. However, their empirical approach differs from ours as they do not 
 
8 Ernst and Spengel (2011) include 20 countries, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) include 18 countries, 
Böhm et al. (2014) include 22 countries and Griffith et al. (2014) include 15 countries. 
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include the statutory income tax rate in the inventor country as an independent variable. Their 
independent variable of interest is the applicant country CIT rate, whereas we consider the inventor 
country CIT rate to be equally important. When MNEs decide where to apply for a patent, both 
the applicant country and inventor country CIT rates are decisive. Therefore, we will have two 
main regressors in our analysis. Thus, we are able to analyse how tax differences between inventor 
country and applicant country determines where the MNE will conduct the patent application.  
There are three different models in this thesis, which can be summarized as follows: The first 
model aims to give empirical evidence of profit shifting activities. The model estimates the 
probability of patent applicant and patent inventor to be geographically separated. The second 
model focuses on number of patent applications per affiliate, and how sensitive they are to changes 
in European tax rates. Finally, the third model is an extension of the second model, which 
investigates whether low- or high-quality patents are predominantly used in profit shifting 
activities. For simplicity reasons, these models will henceforth be called the inventor model, main 
model and quality model. 
This thesis is structured in eight parts and proceeds as follows: Section 2 will shortly review the 
existing literature that have been done on this topic, and how it relates to our thesis. Section 3 will 
introduce theoretical considerations and predictions of the models that are going to be used. 
Section 4 will continue with the relevant data description, followed by section 5 which 
demonstrates our empirical strategy. Thereafter, section 6 will present and analyse the empirical 
results from our three models. In order to strengthen our results, various samples and specification 
choices of our results will be examined by performing robustness tests in section 7. Finally, section 
8 consists of concluding statements. 
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2 Literature review 
In order to delineate the academic climate on this topic, this section will review previous literature 
and their findings. As our thesis is built upon the research of Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and 
Böhm et al. (2015), their findings are valuable knowledge to our analysis. Further studies that are 
examining this field will be outlined to establish an academic basis to compare our results.  
According to Dischinger and Riedel (2011, p. 691), affiliates within an MNE had little to no fees 
for using patents or trademarks until the early 1990s. However, as intangible assets have become 
critical factors in product innovation and marketing, owners of intellectual property started 
charging affiliates, resulting in intra-firm trade of immaterial goods. Furthermore, the authors point 
to anecdotal evidence that MNEs transfer their intellectual property to low-tax jurisdictions. For 
instance, Pfizer and Microsoft have relocated much of their R&D holdings and patents in Ireland. 
Some companies have even founded intangible-holding companies in tax havens that own and 
administer their brands and licenses. Shell, for instance, has located their brand management at a 
Swiss affiliate where they charge royalties to operating affiliates worldwide (Dischinger and 
Riedel, 2011, p 691). In addition, several financial consultancies promote global tax planning 
strategies by relocating intellectual property to low-tax affiliates.  
Profit shifting by locating intellectual property in low-tax economies is a relatively new field of 
study. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) were among the first to study empirically whether there is a 
systematic behaviour amid MNEs to shift profits by relocating their intangible assets to low-tax 
countries. Using panel data consisting of 23 EU countries for ten years, Dischinger and Riedel 
(2011, p. 692) analyse “whether corporate taxes distort the location of intangible assets within a 
corporate group”. Their results suggest that subsidiaries with the lowest relative corporate tax rate 
within the multinational group hold a higher level of intangible assets. Furthermore, as MNEs are 
increasingly aware that intellectual property is an essential factor in contributing to the overall 
profit and marketing, their results suggest that multinationals distort these assets’ location to 
minimize their overall tax liabilities. The semi-elasticity of their study is -1.7, expressing that a 
one percentage point decrease in the average tax difference to all affiliates in the MNE raises the 
number of intangible assets in an affiliate by around 1.7% on average (p. 700).  
 15 
In the works of Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), they narrow their scope of research by excluding 
intangible assets such as trademarks and copyrights, focusing on patents only within multinationals 
and whether their location is affected by corporate taxation. Using a unique dataset that combines 
company accounting data with information on patent applications provided by the EPO, they find 
that a subsidiary’s number of patent applications are substantially and negatively affected by 
corporate taxation. Their results prevail when controlling for affiliate size, firm-fixed effects, and 
time-varying country characteristics. Furthermore, the results withhold when they account for CFC 
legislation and the role of withholding taxes on royalty payments. Unlike the study of Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) include two regressors of interest, the tax rate 
differential to other group affiliates and corporate tax rates. Both variables exert a significantly 
negative effect on the number of patent applications. According to their estimates, the semi-
elasticity of their results is around -3.5. This suggests that a one percentage point decrease in 
corporate tax rates will, in general, increase the number of patent applications in an affiliate by 
3.5%.  
The research by Griffith et al., (2014) conforms to the findings of Dischinger, Karkinsky and 
Riedel. Using an even large time sample (1985-2005), they also find that reforms with preferential 
tax treatments on patent income, such as patent boxes, have a substantial effect on where MNEs 
choose to locate their intellectual property.  
Böhm et al. (2015, p. 4) discuss the main reasons why patents are considered attractive instruments 
for shifting income. First, R&D activities typically generate higher-than-average returns (see e.g., 
Hall, Mairesse, & Mohnen, 2009)), and many patents have significant industrial value. 
Multinationals are thereby enticed to place their patents in low-tax affiliates in order to lower their 
corporate tax burden. With higher earnings potential, the incentive becomes even stronger. Second, 
protected intellectual property is often used as a common input factor for many operating affiliates 
within an MNE. They are obliged to pay a royalty on this use to the patent owner. Thus, placing 
patents in a low-tax subsidiary may encourage more profit shifting since a low-tax subsidiary can 
overstate the royalty prices they charge other affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions. As a result, the 
tax burden of the MNE is reduced. Third, trading costs for patent-protected intellectual property 
are extremely low, allowing them to be isolated from operating affiliates in high-tax countries at a 
low cost.  
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There are different methods MNEs can relocate patents to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions. The 
most common way this is done implies that the inventor of a patent and the one applying for it are 
located in different countries (Böhm et al., 2015, p. 1). Their results suggest the probability of 
relocating a patent is positively correlated with an increase in the applicant country CIT rate. 
Juranek, Schindler, and Schneider (2018) analyse another concern regarding profit shifting; MNEs 
that are relocating intellectual property from high-tax jurisdictions to countries that have 
implemented patent box regimes. As previously mentioned, governments are increasingly 
concerned about such relocation of intangible assets as it decreases the corporate tax base. Their 
research adds to the studies on patent location and tax incentives by accounting for patent box 
regimes and how the relating challenges can be handled. According to the authors, a patent box 
regime offers preferential tax rates for intellectual property revenues. In addition, there is no 
requirement that royalty income should be linked to the domestic economic operation that a 
business engages in to produce the underlying intellectual property. As a result, patent box regimes 
can be used to attract corporate profits through tax competition. Due to this, the tax base of the 
inventor country will be reduced.  
Another study on patent boxes is conducted by Alstadsæter et al. (2018). They analyse the different 
types of patent boxes, and how they affect patent position and local inventorship (p. 135). The 
authors have a dataset providing information on world corporate R&D investors’ patent 
applications to the EPO from 39 home countries in 33 different host countries from 2000 to 2012. 
Their research is focused on the top 2,000 global corporate R&D investors. According to their 
results, patent box regimes have a significant impact on attracting foreign patents. High-quality 
patents, i.e., patents with high earnings potential, are particularly influenced by patent boxes in 
their location choices (p. 135). The findings of Alstadsæter et al. argue that patent box regimes 
struggle to incentivize industries to establish local research, despite the purpose of patent box 
regimes being to promote innovation. Thus, the effects of patent boxes appear to be mainly of a 
tax nature.  
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3 Patents and profit shifting in theory  
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
In this section, we discuss the impact foreign corporate tax structures have on patent ownership 
within multinational corporations.  
A patent yields the owner an exclusive right to utilize an invention. In other words, it grants an 
interim monopolistic right to benefit from the technology within the geographic region to which it 
has been granted. The patent owner can charge other parties outside the multinational group a 
royalty fee if they want to exploit the technology as well. However, MNEs often wish to keep the 
invention from third parties. Hence, they tend to sell patents to affiliates within the multinational 
group only. The receiving affiliate are further on required to pay a royalty to the selling firm. Our 
dataset provides important insight in the location of patents, and often, the inventor firm and 
holding firm are geographically separated.  
As mentioned in section 2, MNEs are increasingly aware that intellectual property is an essential 
factor in contributing to their overall profit and marketing. To many MNEs, patents are even 
considered as some of their most valuable assets. With this in mind, it is palpable to assume that 
MNEs wish to decrease their overall tax burden as much as possible by locating their patents in 
affiliated companies in low tax-jurisdictions. Thus, choosing the patent location within a 
multinational group is influenced by different tax-considerations (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012, p. 
177). This is especially true for patents, as the newly created knowledge often accounts for a large 
portion of the company's profits, while at the same time, the manufacturing affiliates typically 
generate relatively low profits (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011, p. 693).  
Due to the intangible nature of patents, locating them at low-tax affiliates is beneficial. Many 
affiliate companies in an MNE are reliant on different intangible inputs in their production. As 
users of intellectual property are forced to pay a royalty fee to the selling affiliate, it enables the 
MNE to shift profits from all manufacturing affiliates to the patent holding affiliate. As mentioned, 
since manufacturing firms’ profits are relatively small, they are able to shift what little income 
they generate to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions by overrating the actual intra-firm transfer price, 
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resulting in a significant reduction in the company’s overall tax base. Thus, affiliates in low-tax 
countries may act as a profit shifting link to all other high-tax affiliates. This would not be the case 
if the patent was located in a high-tax affiliate as other high-tax affiliates would lack shifting 
opportunities. This in turn is another incentive for MNEs to locate their intellectual property at 
low-tax affiliates.  
According to Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, p. 178), not all new inventions are patented, but rather 
kept in secrecy. It is difficult for fiscal authorities to observe internal firm knowledge. Once this 
knowledge is patented, however, it attracts taxable income. This is because the technology is 
manifested, and the various consumers of the technology in the production chain must fund the 
intellectual property. In comparison, revenue attributable to intellectual property accrues to the 
operating affiliates while knowledge is used informally within an MNE, such as by higher 
premiums paid to final consumers. Patenting new technology attracts revenue from high-tax 
operating affiliates. It is thus an appealing tactic to patent in low-tax affiliates, in addition that it 
lowers the MNEs’ total tax burden as well.  
Another consideration is the fact that royalty paying countries often charge a withholding tax rate 
on royalties that are paid across borders (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012, p. 178). The affiliates that 
receive the income stream from selling a patent to an associated affiliate often apply for a tax credit 
on the withholding taxes that they have already paid. This is usually done before the income stream 
is valued at their local statutory tax rate. That way, the patent selling affiliate is able to avoid 
international double taxation. Thus, it is the relation between the size of the corporate income tax 
at the country that sells the intellectual property and the withholding tax placed by the country that 
purchase the intellectual property, that determines the effective tax burden. For instance, if the 
country that receives the royalty payment has a higher corporate tax rate than the withholding tax 
that is originally paid, they will receive a credit for the tax that have already been paid. As a result, 
the effective tax on the royalty income equals the receiving country’s corporate tax rate. Moreover, 
this means that the withholding tax rate does not affect an MNE’s decision on where they should 
place their patent. Conversely, when the receiving country has a lower tax rate than the withholding 
rate, the royalty payment is taxed at the withholding tax rate. This in turn incentivizes MNEs to 
place their intellectual properties in areas that have benign bilateral tax treaties as they are able to 
ensure low withholding tax payments on their income  (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012, p. 178). 
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In summary, the aforementioned considerations suggest that MNEs have an incentive to place their 
patents at affiliates in countries with low corporate tax rates in relation to other affiliates in the 
group. There are numerous strategies to achieve this. Firstly, MNEs can place their entire R&D 
units in affiliates facing low corporate income taxes. However, this may include substantial costs. 
Hence, it is often assumed that a more common strategy includes locating the head R&D unit at a 
low-tax affiliate and subcontract other research with other R&D units. In addition, another strategy 
for MNEs is to engage in cost-sharing arrangements. The risks and benefits of creating a new 
technology would thus be shared by the different affiliates within the group. These cost-sharing 
arrangements, if properly managed, enable MNEs to delegate an over-proportional sum of income 
to low-tax affiliates. 
From the aforementioned theoretical considerations, we suspect several outcomes from our thesis. 
Firstly, we assume that an increase of tax rates in the inventor country is likely to incentivize MNEs 
to locate their patents in affiliates facing lower taxes. Conversely, an increase in associated 
affiliates’ tax rates is likely to retain MNEs from locating their patents in a different country than 
the inventor country. Secondly, affiliates with lower tax rates than other associated affiliates in the 
same group is likely to hold more patent applications. Thus, we assume that increases in tax rates 
will reduce the number of patent applications. Moreover, based on previous literature (see 
Alstadsæter et al., 2018), we suspect that high-quality patents will be more sensitive to changes in 
taxes as they often generate higher returns than low-quality patents. As mentioned in section 2, the 
higher the earnings potential, the incentive to locate patents at low-tax affiliates increase.   
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4 Data and descriptive statistics  
4.1 Data sources and sample restrictions  
In order to create sample data that includes all necessary dimensions, data have been gathered from 
several different sources9. In the following sections, we are going to unfold the data processing 
step-by-step.  
4.1.1 Affiliate dataset 
To research the extent of which taxes determine the number of patent applications, the most pivotal 
information is number of applications filed by the respective affiliate. The data basis for this thesis 
therefore builds on a dataset provided by Steffen Juranek, which contains merged information on 
patent application ID, with corresponding company BVDID, application date and ownership share. 
BVDID is a unique identification number provided by Bureau van Dijk in the Amadeus database. 
The affiliates’ BVDID is valuable information, because it enables extraction of company specific 
financial, ownership and geographical data from the Amadeus database. To get the associated 
application dates for each patent, the aforementioned dataset has been merged with data gathered 
from EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (hereafter PATSTAT). This database contains 
information on all patent applications dating back to 1978, and their associated patent application 
date. The most recent application date in this merged dataset is August 2018. Because of the 
missing observations from this year, all observations post 2017 have been removed. This has been 
done in order to avoid unbalanced exposure across the year, which could ultimately bias our 
results.  
After the patent application has been filed to the EPO office, companies can still choose to re-
locate these patents to other locations, and thus use them as instruments for profit shifting. The re-
allocations and the correlated transfer prices are unobservable, so we are not able to include that 
in our dataset. However, sales of intangible assets are rare in practice, and are not considered to be 
 
9 For a full overview of the different sources of data, see the appendix, table A. 
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an important strategy for profit shifting (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012).  Therefore, we do not consider 
this problem as something that will decrease the validity of our analysis. 
In order for MNEs to use patents as an instrument for tax avoidance, they have to be in control of 
the relevant affiliate. Therefore, only affiliates that are majority owned by a global ultimate owner 
will be in our main analysis. Furthermore, in order for an affiliate to be included in our dataset, the 
company must have applied for at least one patent during the sample period. Hence, some patent-
holding affiliates will be excluded from our sample data. This being said, the current inclusion of 
affiliates reflects previous studies (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012, p. 179) and thus adequately 
represents the most important patent-holding affiliates in Europe. Further data trimming 
procedures have been done by excluding solely domestic firms as they can’t utilize differences in 
European tax rates.  
After these data trimming procedures have been done, we created a new dataset, aggregating the 
number of patent applications for each affiliate. The non-aggregated dataset will be used for our 
inventor model, while the aggregated dataset will be used for the main model. 
Some of the affiliates in our dataset have a very high number of applications, with a peak at 1,645 
patents. Further trimming of the data have therefore been performed by excluding observations 
with more than 100 patent applications10. By doing so, the analysis will drop the extreme values 
of patent applications and avoid results steered by outliers in the dataset.  
  
 
10 See section 7 on robustness tests where we exclude observations with more than 20 patent applications. 
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Data trimming procedures 
 
After conducting several data trimming procedures, we end up with a sample data that consists of 
33,361 different affiliates, with a total of 168,153 patent applications. The step-by-step approach 
can be observed in table 1. In order to obtain our final sample, we first removed observations where 
the patent had more than one owner. We further excluded all the non-relevant countries from our 
base dataset, before limiting the sample data to the selected time sample. After this, we proceeded 
with some affiliate specific trimming procedures. Firstly, we removed all the observations where 
the affiliates were not majority owned. Second, we removed purely domestic firms. Finally, we 
removed all observations that have more than 100 patent applications in a single year in order to 
avoid over dispersion.  
Another vital data management aspect that has been done in this thesis is to include observations 
where the affiliate did not apply for a patent. All the years that an affiliate did not apply for a patent 
are valuable information to our analysis. From table 1 it can be observed that there are 33,361 




Number of patent 
applications percentage 
(1) All patent applications from 1978 
with corresponding affiliate BVDID 225,413 100.00% 3,106,175 100.00% 
(2) Remove observations where 
ownership share is more than 1 209,457 209,457 2,795,650 90.00% 
(3) Removing countries that are not 
included in our dataset 119,037 52.81% 1,275,839 41.07% 
(4) Limiting that dataset to only 
include patent applications between 
2011-2017 43,487 19.29% 320,043 10.30% 
(5) Remove the observations where 
affiliates are not majority owned 39,365 17.46% 278,457 8.96% 
(6) Removing purely domestic 
affiliates 34,291 15.21% 238,098 7.67% 
(7) Removing observations with over 
100 patent applications in a single 
year 33,361 14.80% 168,153 5.41% 
Final sample 33,361 14.80% 168,153 5.41% 
Table 1: Data trimming procedures 
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our main data sample is 233,319. The remaining observations comes from including all the years 
where the relevant affiliate did not apply for a patent11.  
4.1.2 Inventor and applicant country dataset  
As previously mentioned, the inventor dataset has not been aggregated, since we are not interested 
in affiliate information when investigating a general tendency of allocations of patents. Therefore, 
an observation in this dataset equals one patent and its associated characteristics. Inventor specific 
information has been retrieved from the OECD database (2021), which includes information about 
the inventor(s) of the patent, and where they currently live.  
Patents can have multiple inventors, which can also be located in different countries and even in 
different MNEs. This provides some challenges. Therefore, we decided that the inventor country 
differs from the applicant country if 50% or more of the patent inventors are located outside the 
applying country.  
The number of patent applications are higher in our inventor model sample data, as some of the 
data trimming procedures that are suitable for the aggregated data sample is not necessarily fit for 
this data sample. Therefore, the inventor model will have a total of 317,775 patent applications, 
compared to the main model with 168,153 applications. 
4.1.3 High versus low quality patents 
In order to determine the quality of the patents, the quality index elaborated by the OECD will be 
implemented. The quality indicator developed by OECD statistical department have been 
consolidated by 6 different qualifications: Number of forward citations (up to 5 years after 
publication), patent family size, number of claims, patent generality index, backward citations and 
grant lag. Since we have a high degree of recency in our dataset, the resulting quality indexes will 
be partly missing, and thus our data sample will be reduced. The recency is the cause for the 
reduction of observations because determining the quality of a patent is difficult when the 
associated characteristics have not yet been applied or tested. We are not too concerned about this 
inconvenience, as the resulting observations prevail as sufficient compared to relevant literature 
 
11 See appendix, table C for overview of number of observations by patent applications 
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(see Alstadsæter et al., 2018). The quality index is a number between 0 and 1, which is calculated 
by taking the unweighted average mean of the 6 aforementioned components12.   
To determine the semi-elasticities for high- and low-quality patents, we have separated the patents 
with a quality index threshold of 0.3, 0.35 and 0.4, respectively. 45.7% of all patents are considered 
high quality when the threshold is 0.3, 25.6% when the threshold is 0.35, and 12.7% when the 
threshold is 0.4. By separating the patents at different thresholds, the analysis can better pinpoint 
which patents are likely to be used in profit shifting activities. Formally, our approach can be 
written as following:  
 
1. 𝑃𝑄𝐼 > 0.3 =  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑄𝐼 < 0.3 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
2. 𝑃𝑄𝐼 > 0.35 =  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑄𝐼 < 0.35 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
3. 𝑃𝑄𝐼 > 0.4 =  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑄𝐼 < 0.4 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
 
Where 𝑃𝑄𝐼 stands for the patent quality indicator. Correspondingly to our main dataset, the 
number of patent applications will be aggregated for each unique affiliate. We thus create three 
different datasets that contain aggregated patent applications per affiliate for each of the three 
quality thresholds. In that way, we can observe how many low- and high-quality patents each 
affiliate has every year, at different quality indicators.  
4.2 Dependent variables 
For the inventor model, the dependent variable that will be estimated is a binary variable that takes 
the value of 1 if applicant country is different from inventor country.  
In the main model, the dependent variable is number of patent applications. In order to structurally 
arrange our dataset with affiliates and their corresponding patent application(s), country and 
ownership share, we aggregate the data by affiliates so that we have the cumulated patent 
 
12 See Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004) for further discussion about calculating the unweighted mean, and 
more in-depth discussion concerning the definition of a quality of a patent. 
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applications for each affiliate in the relevant year. Since each patent application only occur once, 
aggregating the number of observations each affiliate occur will effectively result in number of 
patent applications for that specific year and affiliate. The same dependent variable will be used 
in the quality model. 
4.3 Tax variables 
Our model consists of three different tax variables, effective tax rate 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡, statutory income tax 
rate 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡, and a patent box dummy 𝐷𝑖𝑡. Effective tax rate is the applicable tax rate for income 
generated from licensing patent royalties. The effective tax rate can formally be written as:  
4. 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡 {
  1    𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
0    𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡
 
Where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is effective tax rate in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that will take the 
value 1 if there is a patent box tax deduction in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. If the dummy variable equals 
0, the normal statutory tax rate will be used as effective tax rate. If the dummy variable equals 1, 
the effective tax rate will have patent box tax rates. The CIT rate is the applicable country specific 
tax rate that will be utilized if the country has not implemented any patent box tax deduction.  
Regulatory tax data have primarily been gathered from the Tax Foundation.org (2020). This data 
provides all applicable statutory tax rates throughout our sample period. The process of 
implementing the patent box tax deductions is more tedious. As described in section 1, there are 
no European regulatory tax guidelines that determines an admissible patent tax rate. Therefore, 
our data accumulation has been from different sources, which has been cross validated to ensure 
correctness. There are 13 different countries that have implemented patent boxes in our dataset: 
Great Britain, Ireland, The Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, Switzerland, 
Cyprus, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta. The patent box tax deductions are gathered primarily 
from EY’s “Worldwide R&D Incentives Reference Guide” (2020). For further data collecting 
where this guide is inadequate, the article “Patent Boxes Design, Patents Location and Local 
R&D” (Alstadsæter et al., 2018) have been used.  
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4.4 Control variables 
In addition to our main independent variables, there are other factors that may affect the number 
of patent applications. Therefore, we chose to include four country specific control variables. 
These control variables are intellectual property protection (hereafter IP protection), freedom from 
corruption, the logarithm of gross domestic product (hereafter GDP) and the number of researchers 
per 1 million inhabitants. The common denominator in all of these control variables is that we wish 
to account for country specific attractiveness. Furthermore, these variables will naturally attract 
R&D investors. Another argument for including these control variables is to produce results that 
are comparable to similar studies in this field (see e.g., Riedel 2012, Griffith et al. 2014). All of 
the aforementioned control variable data has been gathered from The World Bank (2018, 2019). 
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
In the following section, we take a deeper look in the main statistics relevant for the thesis. First, 
we present the country specific information with observations, affiliates, patent applications and 
corresponding percentages. Thereafter, table 3 presents relative numbers of applications per 
100,000 inhabitants and affiliates. Finally, the relevant tax changes in our sample period will be 
outlined.  
The importance of high inclusion of affiliates has previously been emphasized. Country specific 
data has been provided in table 2. As previously mentioned, this thesis’ sample data has only 
included European countries. The observations cumulate to 33,389 different affiliates across our 
sample data. Non-surprisingly, the most reoccurring countries are Germany, Italy and Great 
Britain, with 10,097, 5,392 and 4,998 affiliates respectively. The countries with the lowest number 
of affiliates are Croatia, Latvia and Hungary, with 13, 17 and 21 affiliates. These countries also 
















Austria 8,357 3.58% 1,195 3.58% 7,278 4.33% 
Belgium 2,966 1.27% 425 1.27% 3,867 2.30% 
Bulgaria 266 0.11% 39 0.12% 52 0.03% 
Switzerland 10,881 4.66% 1,558 4.67% 13,077 7.79% 
Cyprus 308 0.13% 45 0.13% 85 0.05% 
Czech rep. 1,351 0.58% 194 0.58% 370 0.22% 
Germany 70,591 30.26% 10,097 30.24% 65,035 38.72% 
Denmark 7,195 3.08% 1,029 3.08% 5,007 2.98% 
Estonia 553 0.24% 80 0.24% 115 0.07% 
Spain 7,280 3.12% 1,041 3.12% 2,741 1.63% 
Finland 5,844 2.50% 838 2.51% 3,878 2.31% 
France 12,556 5.38% 1,801 5.39% 16,440 9.79% 
UK 34,982 14.99% 4,998 14.97% 15,361 9.15% 
Greece 154 0.07% 23 0.07% 90 0.05% 
Croatia 84 0.04% 13 0.04% 13 0.01% 
Hungary 140 0.06% 21 0.06% 74 0.04% 
Ireland 3,101 1.33% 444 1.33% 1,746 1.04% 
Italy 37,737 16.17% 5,392 16.15% 14,300 8.51% 
Luxembourg 1,197 0.51% 172 0.52% 1,044 0.62% 
Latvia 112 0.05% 17 0.05% 15 0.01% 
Malta 378 0.16% 55 0.16% 312 0.19% 
Netherlands 10,162 4.36% 1,456 4.36% 7,176 4.21% 
Norway 4,802 2.06% 687 2.06% 1,633 0.97% 
Poland 3,003 1.29% 430 1.29% 898 0.53% 
Portugal 1,323 0.57% 190 0.57% 299 0.18% 
Romania 273 0.12% 40 0.12% 62 0.04% 
Sweden 6,428 2.76% 922 2.76% 6,788 3.98% 
Slovenia 896 0.38% 129 0.39% 312 0.19% 
Slovakia 399 0.17% 58 0.17% 85 0.05% 
Total 233,319 100.00% 33,389 100.00% 168,153 100.00% 
Table 2: Observations, affiliates and patent applications by country 
Germany has the most observations, affiliates and patent applications, with approximately a third 
of all of the aforementioned factors. This number is twice as high as any other country in the 
sample period. Germany is renowned for being a technologically advanced country, hence its high 
number of patent applications. Furthermore, it is also the largest country, surpassing France at 
second with almost 14 million inhabitants. The high number of applications in Germany, and the 
consequential impact that potentially can make in the analysis might be substantial. Therefore, 
Germany will be excluded in the robustness testing in section 7.  
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Number of applications isolated provides limited information. Therefore, we have provided table 
3 that gives number of patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants. By doing so, the descriptive 
statistics give some valuable insight in which countries that have a relative high number of 
applications, compared to the number of inhabitants. When calculating this number, we have used 
the average number of inhabitants in the different countries through the sample period. There are 
some countries that show a great number of patent applications relative to the number of 
inhabitants. Especially high is the relative number in both Switzerland and Luxembourg, with 
155.32 and 176.75, respectively. This number is quite considerable given the average of 32.15. 
The high number of patent applications relative to the number of inhabitants might suggest that 
these countries are being used in profit shifting strategies, which is non-surprising given the 
relaxed taxation in those countries. 
Furthermore, in the same table, we have provided the average number of applications per affiliate. 
This number provides insight to the general patent activity in the country. With an average number 
of 5 patent applications per affiliate, the countries with the most patent applying affiliates are 





Patent applications per 
100,000 inhabitants 
Average number of 
applications per affiliate 
Austria 82.96 6.1 
Belgium 34.07 9.1 
Bulgaria 0.73 1.3 
Switzerland 155.32 8.4 
Cyprus 9.94 1.9 
Czech rep. 3.50 1.9 
Germany 78.81 6.4 
Denmark 87.10 4.9 
Estonia 8.74 1.4 
Spain 5.89 2.6 
Finland 70.47 4.6 
France 24.54 9.1 
UK 23.34 3.1 
Greece 0.84 3.9 
Croatia 0.31 1.0 
Hungary 0.76 3.5 
Ireland 36.49 3.9 
Italy 23.60 2.7 
Luxembourg 176.75 6.1 
Latvia 0.77 0.9 
Malta 67.78 5.7 
Netherlands 41.42 4.9 
Norway 31.06 2.4 
Poland 2.36 2.1 
Portugal 2.90 1.6 
Romania 0.32 1.6 
Sweden 66.91 7.3 
Slovenia 15.10 2.4 
Slovakia 1.56 1.5 
Average 32.15 5.0 










4.5.1 Tax rate statistics 
In the following section, we provide statistics on the statutory tax development in Europe during 
our sample period. The first changes we examine are the effective tax rates and the CIT rate. The 
effective tax rate is calculated by implementing the relevant patent box tax deductions, which is 
why a continuous drop in table 4 can be observed during the period. Most notably is Malta, which 
has an effective tax rate of 0% due to the deduction from their patent box regime. The consistently 
highest effective tax rate is in Germany, with a rate of 30.175% throughout the sample period13. 
 
Table 4: Effective tax rate, CIT rate, and effective tax rate on patent box countries 
In order to understand how considerable some of the tax deductions are, table 4 also includes a 
graph depicting the average tax rate for the countries that have implemented patent box regimes. 
The largest difference caused by the patent box regimes derives from Malta, where the tax 
reduction represents a change of 35 percentage points. The lowest difference comes from Ireland, 
 









2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Effective tax rate and CIT rate 2011 - 2017
Effective tax rate CIT rate Effective tax rate Patent box countries
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with a deduction on 6.25 percentage points. This reduction is lower compared to other countries, 
but Ireland already has an inherently low statutory tax rate of 12.5%14.  
Additionally, table 5 provides an overview of the patent box dummy variable. This table is outlined 
so that the time of the patent box implementation can be observed for each country. Previously, 
countries have been pressured from the EU to abolish the patent box regimes, which happened in 
Ireland in 2010. They have, however, been able to implement a new regime that is still being 
used15. Despite efforts from the EU, this table shows a tendency of more countries choosing to 
implement a patent box scheme. After the patent box has been implemented, none of the European 
countries in our sample have removed them. From table 5, we can observe that Italy implemented 
a patent box regime in 2017. Furthermore, Portugal and Ireland are countries that have recently 
chosen to include a patent box regime in their regulatory tax systems.  
  Patent box dummy 2011 - 2017 
 1 indicates that patent box has been implemented 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cyprus 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Malta 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 






14 See appendix, table D for complete overview of the tax deductions from patent box regimes. 
15 Ireland implemented an alternative called “knowledge development box” in 2015, offering a reduced 
tax rate of 6.25%. 
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4.5.2 Summary statistics  
Panel A of table 6 shows the summary statistics from both the dependent and independent variables 
that are being used in the inventor model. This panel reveals that the inventor of a patent is located 
in a different country than where it is applied for approximately 20% of the time, which is a 
considerable proportion. This proportion represents 63,555 patent applications that are potentially 
being used as profit shifting instruments. Panel B of table 8 shows the summary statistics of our 
main model, where we investigate number of applications conducted by affiliates. The panel shows 
a yearly average of 0.72 patent applications per affiliate, with a standard deviation of 3.67.  
Panel A and B in table 7 depict the descriptive statistics from the six different patent quality 
datasets that are being used in our quality model. The panels are split by the three quality thresholds 
of 0.3, 0.35 and 0.4, respectively. We can observe from the panels that the number of observations 
has decreased a considerable amount compared to our main dataset. The cumulated observations 
from both the high-and low-quality patents represents 52,191 observations, compared to the main 
dataset with 233,319 observations. These reductions have previously been elaborated in section 
4.1.3. Since the threshold for high-quality patents increase, the low-quality datasets will have more 
observations than the high-quality datasets. To further demonstrate the distribution between high- 
and low-quality patents, panel C in table 7 gives an overview of how many applications there are 
for each of the three thresholds.  
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Different country 0.1923 0.39 
Applicant statutory income tax rate 28.19 5.09 
Inventor statutory income tax rate 28.87 5.37 
Applicant effective tax rate 21.82 9.15 
Inventor effective tax rate 22.59 8.81 
IP protection applicant country 5.527 0.58 
Freedom of corruption applicant country 1.697 0.52 
Freedom of corruption inventor country 1.595 0.6 
Number of observations 317776 
 




Number of patent applications 0.72 3.67 
Effective tax rate 22.27 9.02 
Patent box dummy 0.3355 0.47 
Statutory income tax rate 27.25 5.03 
IP protection 5.294 0.81 
Freedom of corruption 1.473 0.72 
Researchers 4139.8 1320.85 
Log GDP 2.19E+12 1.27E+12 
Number of observations 233319 
























Number of applications 2.954 9.73 2.532 6.21 2.161 3.97 
Effective tax rate 23.12 8.92 22.98 8.95 22.74 9.05 
Statutory income tax rate 28.15 4.77 28.18 4.81 28.18 4.83 
Patent box dummy 0.3073 0.46 0.3135 0.46 0.3253 0.47 
IP protection 5.373 0.72 5.398 0.69 5.416 0.68 
Freedom of corruption 1.567 0.64 1.59 0.62 1.607 0.61 
Researchers 4210 1153.73 4239.6 1125.37 4271.6 1105 
Log GDP 2.30E+12 1.30E+12 2.28E+12 1.31E+12 2.26E+12 1.32E+12 
Number of observations 24449 15768 9181 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for low-quality patent datasets 
 
Low-quality patents  
< 0.3 
Low-quality patents  
< 0.35 









Number of applications 3.014 14.21 3.308 16.35 3.475 17.4 
Effective tax rate 23.08 8.88 23.13 8.89 23.14 8.89 
Statutory income tax rate 28.05 4.87 28.06 4.83 28.04 4.82 
Patent box dummy 0.3102 0.46 0.3076 0.46 0.306 0.46 
IP protection 5.324 0.76 5.323 0.76 5.323 0.76 
Freedom of corruption 1.515 0.68 1.516 0.68 1.518 0.68 
Researchers 4152.1 1199.4 4148.9 1205 4148.3 1203.5 
Log GDP 2.28E+12 1.29E+12 2.29E+12 1.29E+12 2.28E+12 1.29E+12 
Number of observations 27742 35066 39145 
 
  Panel C: Distribution of patent applications 
  0.3 0.35 0.4 
  distribution percentage distribution percentage distribution percentage 
High quality 71158 45.7% 39816 25.6% 19747 12.7% 
Low quality 83573 54.3% 115915 74.4% 135984 87.3% 
Total 
applications 155731 155731 155731 
Table 7: Summary statistics, quality model 
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5 Empirical strategy and regression specification 
Our thesis considers three different regression specifications. First, we aim to add a dimension that 
has scarcely been used in previous research; does the tax rate affect the probability of a patent 
inventor and applicant to be geographically separated? This model is implemented to give 
empirical evidence that patents are used as instruments for profit-shifting. Further, the main model 
is applied to determine if, and to what extent, the number of patent applications in an affiliate is 
affected by different tax measures. The quality model is an extension of the main model, which 
aims to determine whether high- or low-quality patents are predominantly used in profit shifting 
activities. 
5.1 Inventor model 
The theoretical predictions for this model have been outlined in section 3.1. For this model we are 
estimating a binomial dependent variable, that takes the value of 1 if applicant country and inventor 
country is different. In this model, we assume that the applicant country tax rate will reduce the 
likelihood of the dependent variable being 1, contrary to inventor country tax rate, which we 
assume will increase the probability of the dependent variable being 1. Due to this, the most 
pertinent model to fit the data is a logistic regression, which gives the following regression 
specification: 
 





In this model, the dependent variable 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the inventor 
of the patent is in a different country than where the patent has been applied for. At the right hand-
side of the model, we have the intercept  𝛽0 and our main independent variables of interest; 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 
and 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡. The first independent variable depicts the CIT rate in the country where the patent 𝑖 
was invented at time 𝑡. The second represents the CIT rate in the applicant country where patent 𝑖 
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was applied for, at time 𝑡. Further on, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector that includes several country specific control 
variables. These include the logarithm of GDP in each country to see whether rich countries are 
more lucrative for holding patents. We also include two more variables that measures the level of 
freedom from corruption and the level of IP protection. Finally, we add the number of researchers 
per 1,000,000 inhabitants. Using data on number of researchers for each country we test whether 
affiliates in countries with relatively high number of researchers are more attractive locations. As 
mentioned in the article by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, p. 182), there may be other reasons why 
different affiliates are attractive for holding the patents of a multinational group. These are 
however difficult or impossible to observe. To deal with this, we include a set of affiliate-fixed 
effects denoted by 𝜃𝑖. These will help capture time-constant firm differences. We also include 
year-fixed effects denoted by 𝜚𝑡, which accounts for shocks that occur over time and affect all 
affiliates.  
Contrary to the main model in section 5.2, the inventor model is not affiliate aggregated, and will 
thus examine a general tendency of profit shifting. This being said, the basis of the two models is 
the same as all the affiliates and patent applications from the main model are included in the 
inventor model. The results from the inventor model can thus be directly translated to the analysis 
of the main model. By doing so, we can establish a strong indication of profit shifting activities in 
the same data that we are going to use in later regressions.  
5.2 Main model 
The principal methodology part of our main model follows the model specifications proposed by 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, p. 182). Precisely, we aim to replicate their study with newer data 
and adjustments we see fit. Thus, our model specification is as follows: 
 
6. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
 
Our dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, depicts the number of patent applications in affiliate 𝑖 in year 𝑡. This 
is estimated based on different tax-measures that is denoted 𝑇𝑖𝑡. This includes the corporate income 
tax rates that the affiliates face, in addition to an effective corporate income tax measure. The latter 
 37 
accounts for patent box tax rates for those countries that have implemented this. The next regressor 
is a dummy variable that we call box-dummy. This takes the value 1 if a country has implemented 
a patent box regime and is used in combination with the normal statutory corporate income taxes. 
We assume that all the aforementioned explanatory variables except the dummy will have a 
negative effect on the dependent variable. In addition, we include a set of country specific control 
variables, affiliate, year and country-fixed effects. The inclusion of these have been elaborated in 
the previous section. 
In our first set of regressions, we estimate the equation using a fixed effects OLS model. We further 
estimate our model using negative binomial regressions with fixed effects. Due to the count nature 
of our dependent variable, the latter model is applicable. Another argument for using a fixed effects 
negative binomial model is because the data is over-dispersed i.e., the majority of observations has 
only one or zero patent applications. Furthermore, our main model aims to replicate the results by 
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) with newer data. Since the authors use a fixed effects negative 
binomial model, we also include this in our thesis to produce comparable results.  
The model is estimated using panel data consisting of affiliates that are majority owned by 
European multinationals. MNEs have the ability to set overrated intra-firm transfer prices to shift 
profits from patent holding affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax affiliates. Our data shows 
the number of patent applications in an affiliate 𝑖 located in a country at year 𝑡. Using different 
tax-measures as described, we can test how the number of patent applications are affected by 
changes in tax rates. 
Another aspect that is important to address is endogeneity issues and survey the unbiasedness in 
our model. A possible endogeneity issue that could arise from our sample data concerns all the tax 
variables. Large MNEs can incite beneficial tax regulations by consistent profit shifting, and thus 
influence countries to change their regulatory tax policies. Countries that systematically miss out 
on possible income due to profit shifting, might therefore introduce favourable tax rates. The 
implementation of various patent box regimes is a potential result of this. 
This being said, we have excluded all global ultimate owners, as well as observations with over 
100 patent applications. This in turn means that the remaining affiliates in our sample is likely to 
be too insignificant in the grand scheme of things to provoke changes in statutory income tax rates. 
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Furthermore, comparable endogeneity issues have been controlled for in a previous study 
conducted by Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme (2008). When they control for the possible issues, 
they find that it has little effect to their base results. Due to the aforementioned arguments, it is 
therefore reasonable to assume that the tax rates are exogenous with respect to the influence of 
firms.  
5.3 Quality model  
The model that has been outlined in the aforementioned section will be adjusted in order to 
investigate what types of patents that are predominantly used as instruments for profit shifting 
activities. The previously outlined model has been altered to the following:  
 
7. 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
8. 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
The patents are characterized as either high- or low-quality depending on three different 
thresholds. Both of the models above will be estimated three separate times with a patent quality 
indicator threshold of 0.3, 0.35, and 0.4. This model is an adjustment to the main model, which is 
why we include the same independent variables. Furthermore, we will examine the semi-
elasticities for the different thresholds. When calculating this, we use the logarithm of number of 
patent applications at affiliate 𝑖 in time 𝑡. The tax semi-elasticities represent a change in the share 
of patents for a given affiliate caused by a one percentage point change in the tax rate for the 
affiliate 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
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6 Empirical results 
This section shows the empirical results from estimating our model on affiliates of European 
multinational enterprises during the time period 2011-2017. We start by estimating whether 
different tax measurements have an effect on relocating a patent application from its inventor 
country to another affiliate in a different country. Further on, we run our main regressions of 
interest which analyses how the number of patent applications in an affiliate are affected by 
different tax measurements. Moreover, we split our dataset into high- and low-quality patents and 
test whether high quality patents are more sensitive to taxes. Finally, we discuss how different 
control variables affect the regressors of interest.  
6.1 Inventor model 
In our first regressions, found in table 8, we estimate the inventor model. The estimates are derived 
from a logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy, i.e., it takes the value one if a patent 
is located in a different country than its inventor country. Moreover, a logit model provides a 
probability measure estimating whether the different regressors increase or reduce the probability 
of the dependent variable being one.  
Our results confirm the theoretical predictions from section 3.1. An increase in the corporate 
income tax rate at the inventor country increases the probability that the patent will be relocated 
to another affiliate in another country, all else equal. The opposite is true for an increase in the 
applicant country’s tax rate. The main regressors in this estimation are statistically significant at 
the one percent level. We note that a patent application relocation is more sensitive for a change 
in the inventor country’s tax rate. This regression control for the level of affiliate, year and country-
fixed effects. The results indicate that MNEs tend to keep their patents in affiliates, if affiliates in 




Table 8: Logit regression, inventor model 
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Firstly, (1) tests how the corporate income tax rate in both inventor countries and applicant 
countries affect the probability that a patent will change its ownership from its inventor country. 
Secondly, (2) includes country level control variables. These are indexes that measure different 
scores on the attractiveness of innovation in the different countries. In regression (1) and (2), the 
coefficients of the main variables of interest are practically the same. All main regressors are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. The next two regressions (3) and (4) are identical 
to the former two but also control for the level of affiliate-fixed effects. When controlling for this, 
the coefficients are somewhat reduced. The applicant country CIT rate coefficient is reduced from 
approximately 0.10 in (1) and (2) to around 0.04 in (3) and (4). Similarly, a reduction can be 
observed in inventor country CIT rate coefficients. However, we are not too concerned about this 
reduction, as the coefficients maintain statistically significant. 
6.2 Main model 
Our main regressors consists of three different tax measures. First, we analyse the effect of the 
effective tax variable. In contrast to the standard corporate income tax that shows the normal rates 
at which companies would be taxed for their income, the effective tax rate variable incorporates 
the actual rates it will be facing from income derived from patents. Thus, the variable includes the 
patent box rates for the countries that have implemented this, while it contains the corporate 
income tax rates of those countries without such a regime. Our next variables of interest are used 
in combination with one another, that is, the corporate income tax rate with the box-dummy 
variable that take the value one if a country has implemented a patent box regime, zero otherwise. 
We have used both a fixed effects within model and a fixed effects negative binomial model to 




Table 9: Within regressions, main model 
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The results from table 9 are estimated using a within model and show that both the effective tax 
rate and the patent box dummy are statistically significant at the one percent level, while the 
corporate statutory tax rate is insignificant in both regressions. This corresponds with our 
theoretical predictions, and the results are similar to the findings by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, 
p. 183). However, the authors did not use a dummy variable in combination with the CIT rate. 
Thus, their corporate tax rate is significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable. 
Regression (1) suggests that a one percentage point increase in the effective tax rate at the country 
where an affiliate is located, reduces the number of patent applications by 0.0148. Secondly, the 
CIT rate is statistically insignificant. The patent box regime dummy, on the other hand, suggests 
that if affiliates located in a country which have implemented a patent box, its number of patent 
applications will increase by 0.2233. 
Regressions (3) and (4) include country level control variables. In (3), the main variable of interest 
is the effective tax rate, while the statutory income tax rate and the patent box regime dummy are 
the main regressors in (4). The estimators for both regressions have been somewhat reduced but 
remain statistically significant at the one percent level. Similar to (1) and (2), the CIT rate remains 
statistically insignificant. Regression (3) still suggests a reduction in the number of patent 
applications, though by 0.011. Additionally, regression (4) suggests that affiliates in countries with 
patent boxes increase their number of applications by 0.169.  
We also ran regressions on our main data using a fixed effects negative binomial model. The results 





Table 10: Fixed effects negative binomial, main model 
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In accordance with the within model in table 9, all regressions in table 10 control for the level of 
affiliate, year and country-fixed effects. The different models provide the same outcome, though 
with some differences in the coefficients of the main regressors. Starting with (1), the coefficient 
suggests that the number of patent applications will reduce by 0.0121 from a one percentage point 
increase in the effective tax rate. The results are statistically significant at the one percent level. 
This is fairly similar to both the within model and the findings of Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, p. 
183). Further on, regression (2) suggests that a patent box regime will increase the number of 
patent applications by 0.2252. Conversely to the within regressions, the CIT rate variable is now 
positive and statistically significant. This can be explained by the patent box dummy variable. As 
the CIT rate is the inapplicable tax rate for countries that have implemented patent box regimes, 
the corresponding results must be interpreted with caution. Some countries may still observe a 
high number of patent applications despite having a high CIT rate. A country with a patent box 
regime will have favourable taxes on patent generated income, thus attracting more patent 
applications. However, this effect will not be captured by the CIT rate regressor. The UK for 
instance, have a relatively high CIT rate average of 22%, yet they have the second largest number 
of patent applications. This is eminently due to the implementation of a patent box regime where 
patent related income tax rate is only 10%.  
Regressions (3) and (4) include country level control variables and prove to have little influence 
on the main independent variables. A one percentage point increase in the effective tax suggests 
that the number of patent applications will decrease by 0.0118. Similarly, a country with a patent 
box regime suggests that the number of patent applications will increase by 0.2522, all else equal. 
Additionally, a one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate indicates that the number of 
patent applications will increase by 0.0181. The former paragraph elaborates on this circumstance.  
The results are somewhat comparable to the findings of Alstadsæter et al. (2018, pp. 153, 155). 
However, they split their patents in different fields, including the pharmaceutical industry, 
information and communications technology (ICT) and the car industry. They then regress how 
these different industries’ patent registrations are affected by tax measures. Using a negative 
binomial model, their effective tax rate estimators are negative and significant at the one percent 
level for all industries but the ICT. As we test the effects on patents of all industries, our estimates 
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for the effective tax rate are smaller than that of the authors but show the same pattern, i.e., that 
the effective tax rate exerts a negative effect on the number of patent applications.  
Alstadsæter et al. (2018, p. 155) also regress their model on the effects from a patent box regime. 
Unlike us, they use the tax advantage from a patent box and not a dummy variable. However, the 
overarching results in their article exhibits the same indicative results as our thesis, i.e., that patent 
box regimes have a substantial effect on the number of patent applications. 
In the following, we discuss the contributions and implications of adding control variables to the 
main regressors. Both models add country level control variables that affect the main estimates to 
some degree. Starting with the fixed effects within model in table 9, we find that only the level of 
IP protection is statistically significant when testing for both the effective tax rate, and the CIT 
rate and patent box dummy. The coefficient in both regressions is positive and similar, indicating 
that countries with a high level of IP protection will attract more patent applications. Contrastingly, 
all control variables but the IP protection is statistically significant in the fixed effects negative 
binomial model in table 10. The number of researchers per 1,000,000 inhabitants is extremely low, 
having almost no effect on the dependent variable. The GDP is negatively correlated with the 
number of patent applications which might be explained by the fact that rich economies have 
higher taxes on corporate income. The freedom from corruption on the other hand, is positively 
correlated with the number of patent applications. In general, the control variables reduce the 
estimators of the main regressors, though not by much. This indicates that the added country level 
control variables capture some of the effects from the different tax measures.  
6.3 Quality model 
To further contribute to the studies on the location of intellectual property, we added another 
dimension to our research, i.e., whether high- or low-quality patents are more prone to be used in 
profit shifting activities. Our estimates are calculated by a fixed effects within model. The results 
are somewhat unexpected given previous research. All our regressions indicate that low-quality 
patents are more sensitive to tax changes, suggesting that MNEs are mainly using low-quality 
patents to shift profits.  
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As described in section 4.1.3, we split our main dataset by different thresholds of our quality 
indicators, e.g., the first column in the regressions is labelled “High 0.3”, indicating that the 
regression is run on a dataset with patents that have a quality index of more than 0.3. We start by 
isolating the effective tax rate and its effect on the different patents. All estimates but the threshold 
of 0.4 are statistically significant. In regression (1), the number of patent applications for patents 
with a quality score of more than 0.3 is reduced by 0.088 from a one percentage point increase in 
the effective tax rate. For patents that score 0.35 or higher, the effect decreases and indicate that 
the number of patents will be reduced by 0.056. All regressions account for the level of affiliate, 
year and country-fixed effects. 
In contrast, the low-quality patents indicate an increasing sensitivity to changes in the effective tax 
rate. Starting at the threshold of 0.3, a one percentage point increase in the effective tax rate 
indicates a reduction of patent applications by 0.099. Regression (5) shows that the number of 
patent applications is reduced by 0.119, and finally, regression (6) suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in the effective tax reduces the number of patent applications by 0.128 when the 
threshold is 0.4. All the aforementioned results are significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 11: Fixed effects within, quality model with effective tax 
When adding our set of country level control variables in table 12, the estimates of our main 
regressor does not change significantly. The trend is exactly the same for all regressions, but the 
effective tax rate variable is somewhat reduced. This inclusion of control variables further supports 
the findings as when estimating the effective tax rate alone, suggesting that low-quality patents are 
more sensitive to changes in this tax measure. Moreover, this further indicates that low-quality 
patents are more prone to be used as an instrument to shift profits.  
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Table 12: Fixed effects within, quality model with effective tax and control variables 
Our quality regressions are also estimated by testing for the corporate income tax rate in 
combination with the patent box dummy, found in table 13. The order of the regressions is the 
same as in table 11 and 12, and all regressions control for the level of affiliate, year and country-
fixed effects. Our findings show the exact same trend as our regressions on the effective tax rate, 
i.e., the effect of the statutory corporate income tax rate and patent box dummy variable diminishes 
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when the threshold for high quality patents increases. Conversely, the effects are opposite for the 
low-quality patents when the quality threshold increase. These findings further support the results 
from our former patent quality regressions, indicating that low-quality patents are more sensitive 
to changes in the corporate tax rate and patent box regimes.  
We start the interpretation of our results from table 13 by considering the corporate tax rate and 
patent box dummy without any control variables. For all regressions on the high-quality patents, 
the corporate tax rate is insignificant. Further on, regression (1) shows that if a country has 
implemented a patent box regime, the number of high-quality patent applications increases by 
2.136 when the quality threshold is 0.3. This result is significant at the one percent level. Secondly, 
regression (2) shows that the number of high-quality patent applications increases with 1.234 when 
the threshold is increased to 0.35 and the dummy variable is one. The significance level in 
regression (2) is reduced to the 5 percent level. Thirdly, the patent box dummy is insignificant 
when testing the high-quality patents on a threshold of 0.4.  
When estimating the low-quality patents, we find that the statutory income tax rate is insignificant 
for all low-quality patents. The patent box dummy is significant at the one percent level and 
indicate that the number of low-quality patent applications will increase by 2.198 when the 
threshold is 0.3. Secondly, the patent box dummy for regression (5) is significant at the one percent 
level, indicating that a patent box regime will increase the number of patent applications by 2.695. 
Finally, regression (6) suggests that a patent box regime causes the number of patent applications 
to increase by 2.835 when the threshold for low-quality patents is 0.4. This result is also significant 
at the one percent level.  
 51 
 
Table 13: Fixed effects within, quality model with CIT rate and patent box regime 
As when testing for the effective tax rate, we add our set of country level control variables to the 
regressions on statutory tax rate and patent box dummy. Similar to the CIT rate variable in table 
13, all are insignificant in table 14 as well. In addition, all patent box coefficients have been 
somewhat reduced. Another interesting finding that contradicts the results from table 13, is that 
the patent box estimator is reduced from regression (5) to (6) when the threshold for low-quality 
patents is increased from 0.35 to 0.4. Moreover, the patent box dummy is insignificant for the 
high-quality patents when the threshold is 0.35 and 0.4, once more confirming our former results. 
Thus, only regressions (1), (4), (5) and (6) are relevant to discuss.  
Starting with (1), we find that the patent box dummy is significantly reduced. However, it still 
suggests that a patent box regime will increase the number of patent applications by 1.290. When 
the threshold for quality is 0.3, the high-quality patent sample will include the patents with a quality 
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index between 0.3 and 0.35. In the threshold of 0.35, these will be excluded and thus the 
regressions lose its significance. This indicates that patents with a quality score of 0.35 or less are 
primarily used for profit shifting. Regression (4) shows that a patent box regime will increase the 
dependent variable by 1.870 at a threshold for low-quality patents of 0.3. When increasing the 
threshold to 0.35, the effect is increased to 2.241, while it is reduced to 2.212 when the threshold 
is increased to 0.4. All these results are significant at the one percent level.  
 
Table 14: Fixed effects within, quality model with CIT rate, patent box regime and control variables 
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Summarizing, a patent box regime exerts a substantial effect on the number of patent applications 
for both high- and low-quality patents. However, this effect decreases when the threshold for high 




Table 15: Semi-elasticities, quality model 
When testing for the logarithm of our dependent variable, we derive the semi-elasticities, i.e., the 
percentage change in the number of patent applications from a change in our regressors. As in 
tables 11, 12, 13 and 14, the low-quality patents are the most sensitive. Additionally, when having 
a log-linear model, all estimators on the high-quality patents become insignificant. Thus, our data 
set once again suggests that MNEs tend to use low-quality patents for profit shifting activities.  
As only the low-quality patents yield significant results, we exclude the insignificant results in our 
further discussion. Note that all regressions are tested with the main regressors separately, i.e., they 
are tested with the effective tax rate variable, and then tested for the corporate income tax and the 
patent box dummy variable. Our results suggest that a lower threshold for low-quality patents is 
more sensitive to both changes in the effective tax rate and the dummy variable. Starting with (4), 
we find that a one percentage point change in the effective tax rate change the number of patent 
applications by 0.96%. This percentage change in number of patent applications decreases to 
0.81% when increasing the threshold to 0.35 (5) and 0.66% when the threshold is 0.4 (6). 
 54 
As mentioned, the regressions in table 13 and 14 estimate the effects of both the standard corporate 
income tax rate and the patent box regime dummy. The former is insignificant in all regressions, 
while the latter is significant only for low-quality patents. In regression (4), a patent box regime 
will change the number of patent applications by 18.47% when the threshold for low-quality 
patents is 0.3. Further on, this effect will decrease to 17.15% (5) and finally to 13.51% (6), when 
the threshold is increased to 0.35 and 0.4, respectively.  
In contrast to the findings of Alstadsæter et al. (2018), our results are, as mentioned, somewhat 
unexpected. Yet, our results remain significant and robust when controlling for time-varying 
country characteristics. Former research argues that R&D activities often generate higher-than-
average returns (Hall, Mairesse, & Mohnen (2009)), and that this is especially the case for patents 
with a high earnings potential. Thus, a natural intuition would suggest that the number of high-
quality patent applications would be more sensitive to changes in tax measures. With their high 
earnings potential, an MNE would potentially seek to reduce the tax burden of these patents by 
locating them at low-tax affiliates. However, there might be several reasons why our research 
suggests the opposite. Firstly, high-quality patents are resource intensive to produce. If the purpose 
of a patent is to be used in profit shifting activities, and the interconnected transfer price between 
affiliates is unobservable, MNEs might consider it unnecessary that these patents are of high-
quality. The arms-length price that affiliates pay for the royalties of a patent are not necessarily 
dependent on the quality, but rather motivated by how MNEs can shift the appropriate amount of 
profit. With freedom to set the desired price for licensing a patent, MNEs might chose the ones 
that are less costly. Besides, it is natural to assume that not all MNEs have the necessary resources 
or R&D units that enable them to invent high-quality patents. Finally, our data set use different 
quality indicators than previous literature which may be decisive to our results16. While a patent’s 
value is often measured by the number of forward citations, our quality index is calculated on a 
set of different indicators, provided by the OECD.  
  
 
16 See section 1 where we outlined the difficulties of determining a patent’s quality 
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7 Robustness tests and extensions 
In the following section, we revise our results by widening our analysis and include several 
robustness tests. In order to structurally test our results, we will divide this section in two; first for 
our inventor model, then for the main model. 
In the first regression, found in table 8, we investigated how tax differences affect the probability 
that the inventor is located in a different country than where the application is being conducted. 
For robustness tests, we will firstly perform a probit regression analysis. Furthermore, a test will 
be conducted where we exclude Germany for or sample data. The last test that will be applied for 
the inventor model is by applying the effective tax rates instead of the CIT rates.  
Next, we are going to perform robustness tests on or main model. The first alteration we are going 
to do is removing Germany from this model as well. Consequently, we are going to further trim 
the high values in our dataset by excluding observations with over 20 patent applications. 
Thereafter, we will split the dataset by affiliate size in order to see what types of affiliates that are 
mostly used for profit shifting. In all the following robustness tests, the results from the main 
models are included for easy comparison of the robustness results.  
7.1 Robustness tests on inventor model 
7.1.1  Probit regression analysis 
In the inventor model, we used a logit regression in order to estimate the model. For the purpose 
of testing the robustness of our results, we are going to utilize a probit regression to see if it yields 
the same findings. The regression includes both country and year-fixed effects in regression (1) 
and (3), while (2) and (4) include affiliate fixed effects as well. The outcome from the regressions 
can be seen in Table 16. The results are consistent as all of the independent variables are still 
strongly significant. The coefficients have become somewhat smaller, but the regressions in table 
16 provides the same indicative result as the logit regression.  
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Table 16: Probit, inventor model 
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7.1.2 Excluding Germany 
The next robustness test includes removing Germany from our sample data. The reasoning behind 
doing so is because Germany accounts for 38% of all the patent applications that has been 
conducted in our time period. Due to the great number of German patent applications, we are 
concerned that it might make our results biased. Furthermore, Germany has relatively high 
statutory income tax rates, and are among the few large European countries that has not 
implemented a patent box regime. The general pattern of the results derived from the logit model 
excluding Germany does not affect the coefficients notably. Even though the independent variables 
have somewhat decreased, they are still strongly significant, thus confirming the results we have 
found in our main inventor model. 
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Table 17: Logit model, excluding Germany 
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7.1.3 Effective tax rate as independent variable 
In our inventor model, we used the statutory income tax rate as the main independent variable of 
interest. Even though selecting this independent variable is suitable in our main inventor analysis, 
we still want to investigate whether the effective tax rate might produce different results. 
Corporations that strategically locate their patent application might do so based on both the 
applicable patent box taxes, and/or the normal statutory income tax rates. Selecting effective tax 
rate as an independent variable will thus contribute to assisting the validity in our results. From 
the robustness test regressions, we can observe that the coefficients are lower than the previously 
produced results. The inventor country effective tax rate coefficient in (1) has a value of 0.0548, 
whilst applicant country effective tax rate in (2) is -0.0513. While this model produces somewhat 
smaller coefficients than previously, we have to take into account that inventor country effective 
tax rate is highly difficult to precisely include. There are 111 different inventor countries in our 
sample data, and some of the country specific effective tax rates are lacking. This being said, the 






Table 18: Logit, inventor model with effective tax rate 
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7.2  Robustness tests on main model 
7.2.1 Removing Germany 
For further robustness tests, we remove Germany in this model as well. The reasoning is the same 
as when we performed it above. Since Germany dominates our data sample in the number of patent 
applications, it naturally accounts for a large proportion of the affiliates. The results remain 
consistent when we include this modification. In the first regression, the effective tax rate is 
negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. Compared to the coefficients in our 
main model, the effect has decreased slightly, but not significantly. We can thus consider the large 
number of observations from Germany to not bias our main results.  
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Table 19: Fixed effects within, main model excluding Germany 
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7.2.2 Further excluding high values 
In our main model, we have excluded affiliate observations with over 100 patent applications. 
Even though this number excludes the most extreme values in our dataset, one might still argue 
that our results are being driven by outliers. After excluding the observations with over 100 patent 
applications, the majority of affiliate observations have less than 20 patent applications. In this 
robustness test, we therefore exclude observations with more than 20 applications in a given year.  
Following the estimation methodology from our main model, we use a fixed effects within model.  
From the results in table 20, we can see that the coefficients are consistent with the results found 
in our main analysis in table 9. Expectedly, the coefficients are lower than what they were before. 
This is a natural change since we are removing a big proportion that drives the results. For this 
robustness test, the most important indicator is that the coefficients remain statistically significant, 
and that the results are not driven by outliers.  
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Table 20: Fixed effects within, main model excluding high number of patent applications 
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7.2.3 Large, medium and small affiliates 
In this test, we divide our dataset in three, depending on the size of the affiliates. This is done to 
investigate whether large, medium or small affiliates react differently to changes in the European 
tax environment. By doing so, we can disclose potential heterogeneity that emerges between 
different sized affiliates. In order to divide our sample, we are using the Amadeus database by 
Bureau van Dijk. The database facilitates four different size specifications: Very large, large, 
medium and small. For our division, we are going to cumulate the very large and large affiliates. 
By doing so, we end up with the most equally distributed three datasets.  
The company size classification provided by Bureau van Dijk will be summarized in the following. 
Very large affiliates must match at least one of the following criteria: Operating revenue above 
100 million EUR, total assets above 200 million EUR, or have more than 1,000 employees. In 
order for an affiliate to be characterized as large, it has to either have an operating revenue of at 
least 10 million EUR, total assets of at least 20 million EUR, or have more than 150 employees. 
Medium sized affiliates, on the other hand, needs at least 1 million EUR in operating revenues, 2 
million EUR or more total assets, or have more than 15 employees. If an affiliate doesn’t match 
any of these prerequisites, it will be characterized as a small affiliate.  
In tables 21 to 24 we have used two models – the fixed effects within and fixed effects negative 
binomial model. The regressors that are included are effective tax rate, statutory income tax rate 
and the patent box dummy. From both of the regression specifications we can derive the same 
results – the smallest affiliates are less sensitive to regulatory tax changes.  
First, we look at the effective tax independent variable. In our fixed effects within regression in 
table 21, we can observe that the coefficients are much lower for small sized affiliates than for the 
large and medium sized affiliates. The biggest change happens between large and medium sized 
affiliates, where the effect of the coefficients decreases from -0.0235 in (1) to -0.0066 in (2). Both 
coefficients are significant at the one percent level. The coefficient for the small affiliates is 
significant at the five percent level, with a small coefficient of -0.0027 in (3). For our fixed effects 
negative binomial regressions in table 22, the same tendencies can be observed. For small sized 
companies, the effective tax coefficient (3) is insignificant. For medium and large companies, the 
coefficients are strongly significant at the one percent level. Contrary to the fixed effects within 
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estimator in table 21, the negative binomial regressions indicate that medium sized affiliates are 
more sensitive to tax changes.  
Next, we investigate the results when we change the independent variable from effective tax rate 
to statutory tax rate and the box-dummy variable. Considering the results in our latter regression, 
we expect to see that large and medium affiliates are more sensitive to patent box regimes than 
small affiliates, which is confirmed from the results in table 23 and 24. The results from the fixed 
effects negative model in table 22 indicate that medium sized affiliates are more sensitive to 
changes in the effective tax rates. However, when estimating the model with the CIT rates and the 
patent box dummy in table 24, the results indicate that large affiliates are the most sensitive. In the 
fixed effects within regression in table 23, we can observe that the patent box dummy is substantial 
for large affiliates, with a coefficient of -0.383, significant at the one percent level (1). This 
coefficient is considerably higher than for medium sized affiliates, which is -0.066 (2). For small 
sized affiliates, we observe no significant results (3). In our negative binomial regressions, we also 
observe that the patent box coefficients for large and medium affiliates are significant, while there 
are no significant results for the small affiliates.  
If we look at the results from this robustness test holistically, we can regard our sample data to be 
somewhat heterogeneous. Large and medium affiliates seem to be more sensitive to changes in the 
tax regulatory environment in Europe than smaller ones. The results from our main regression 
should therefore be interpreted with caution, since smaller affiliates are less receptive to tax 




Table 21: Fixed effects within, main model with large, medium and small affiliates, effective tax rates 
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Table 24: Fixed effects negative binomial, main model with large, medium and small affiliates, CIT rates 
and patent box regime 
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8 Conclusion 
It is vital for tax authorities to recognize the degree of strategic profit shifting activities MNEs 
engage in through location of patents. Previous studies have provided insights to the extent of 
which patents are being strategically located and given the associated semi-elasticities. In this 
thesis, we have elaborated further on this topic. By using the model propositions by Karkinsky and 
Riedel (2012), and Böhm et al. (2015) as a point of departure, we have been able to both replicate 
previous findings, and provide new insights and further empirical results.  
To date, there are few studies that gives empirical evidence on the impacts of patent boxes and 
patent location. Many of the published studies on patents and their role in profit shifting have an 
outdated dataset and have thus partially lost their topicality. In this thesis, we have emphasized 
using a high degree of recent observations. We thereby manage to include the handsome tax 
deductions from patents boxes, and yield results that reflect the tax regulatory environment in 
Europe today. The results provided in section 6 shows that the aforementioned patent box regimes 
are more significant in estimating the location of patents than both effective - and statutory income 
tax rate. 
Further evidence on this matter have been provided by utilizing a unique, merged dataset with the 
inventor of the different patents. This thesis has analysed how differences and changes in the tax 
regulatory climate in Europe determines whether an affiliate will choose to apply for a patent in a 
different country than where it was invented. By using a regression with a binomial dependent 
variable that depicts a difference in inventor and applicant country, this thesis has given further 
empirical evidence on patents and their role as instruments for profit shifting. Almost 20% of all 
patents applied for at the EPO have a foreign inventor, and our thesis suggests that many of these 
are strategically located for profit shifting purposes.  
In our main model, we produced the same empirical results as previous studies, and included the 
most applicable tax variables caused by the implementation of patent box regimes in recent times. 
In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that patent boxes exert a substantial effect on 
attracting patent applications. The introduction of patent boxes has caused a spark of suspicion 
that they are primarily used for tax avoidance due to their favourable taxes. Our results suggest 
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that these suspicions are viable. In further interpretation of our results, we found the regulatory tax 
effects are not equal for all affiliates. When we divide the dataset in three, based on the size of the 
affiliates, the results suggest that only large and medium sized affiliates engage in patent shifting 
strategies. Therefore, when interpreting the results of our main analysis, one should be attentive 
that we cannot give decisive results for smaller sized affiliates.  
In the extension of the main model, we find that low-quality patents are predominantly used in 
profit shifting activities. These results were somewhat unanticipated, as it contradicts previous 
literature. In the final elaboration of our analysis, we found that the semi-elasticities were 
noticeably high when estimating for the patent box dummy variable.  
For further research in this topic, we would suggest approaching the same research question with 
a larger inclusion of countries. The results provided in our thesis are limited to European countries, 
whereas an even broader analysis could investigate the importance of other influential countries, 
such as USA, Japan, China, India and Canada. Furthermore, a portion of our sample affiliates are 
likely to be engaged with tax havens, such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda or Gibraltar. For further 
studies, including these countries could provide insightful results. In addition to this, there are, and 
has been since the invention of patents, highly debated how different patents should be 
characterized as high or low patents. For further research, one might choose another indicator of 
patent quality that is also applicable for the same research question. The aforementioned 
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Table A: Definitions of variables and the associated source of data 
Variable   Definition   Source of data 
Applicant country 
statutory income tax rate  
The statutory income 
tax rate in the 
country where the 
patent is applied for  Tax Foundation 
Inventor country statutory 
income tax rate  
The statutory income 
tax rate in the 
country where the 
patent is invented  Tax Foundation 
Applicant country 
effective tax rate  
The applicable 
effective tax rate in 
the country where the 
patent is applied for  
EY R&D 
incentives guide; 
Alstadsæter et al. 
OECD database 
Inventor country effective 
tax rate  
The applicable 
effective tax rate in 
the country where the 
patent is invented  
EY R&D 
incentives guide; 
Alstadsæter et al. 
OECD database 
IP protection applicant 
country  
An indicator of IP 
protection in the 
country where the 
patent is applied for  The world bank 
Freedom of corruption 
applicant country  
An indicator of 
corruption in the 
country where the 
patent is applied for  The world bank 
Freedom of corruption 
inventor country  
An indicator of 
corruption in the 
country where the 
patent is invented  The world bank 
Number of patent 
applications  
The number of 
patents applied for by 
each affiliate in a 
year  Juranek 
Effective tax rate  
The applicable 
effective tax rate on 
income generated 
from patents  
EY R&D 
incentives guide; 




Variable   Definition   Source of data 
Patent box dummy  
A dummy variable 
indicating if a 
country has 
implemented a patent 
box regime   
EY R&D 
incentives guide; 
Alstadsæter et al. 
OECD database 
Statutory income tax rate   
The statutory income 
tax rate applicable for 
the affiliate   Tax foundation 
 
Table B: Year-by-year summary statistics 
This table depicts year-by-year summary statistics of the changes in the tax variables in our 
sample.  
Variable Year Mean Observations 
Effective tax rate 2011 24.71% 33323 
Effective tax rate 2012 24.37% 33324 
Effective tax rate 2013 22.25% 33325 
Effective tax rate 2014 22.01% 33324 
Effective tax rate 2015 21.90% 33324 
Effective tax rate 2016 21.75% 33340 
Effective tax rate 2017 18.92% 33359 
Patent box dummy 2011 19.52% 33323 
Patent box dummy 2012 19.65% 33324 
Patent box dummy 2013 34.65% 33325 
Patent box dummy 2014 35.21% 33324 
Patent box dummy 2015 36.55% 33324 
Patent box dummy 2016 36.55% 33340 
Patent box dummy 2017 52.71% 33359 
Statutory income tax rate  2011 28.24% 33323 
Statutory income tax rate  2012 27.89% 33324 
Statutory income tax rate  2013 27.74% 33325 
Statutory income tax rate  2014 27.29% 33324 
Statutory income tax rate  2015 27.03% 33324 
Statutory income tax rate  2016 26.66% 33340 
Statutory income tax rate  2017 25.92% 33359 
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Table C: Distribution of observations, based on number of patents 
This table depicts the different number of observations and number of patents by specific 
intervals of patent applications.  










50 - 100 patent applications 327 0.14% 22,446 13.3% 
20 - 49 patent applications 1,078 0.46% 32,470 19.3% 
10 - 19 patent applications 1,742 0.75% 23,315 13.9% 
5 - 9 patent applications 3,570 1.53% 23,078 13.7% 
0 - 4 patent applications 226,602 97.12% 66,844 39.8% 




Table D: Differences in tax from patent box regimes  
From this table, we can observe the tax deductions caused by the aforementioned patent box 
regimes.  
  Tax deductions from patent box regimes 
 All numbers under are given in percentages 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Belgium 27.102 27.102 27.102 27.102 27.102 28.8 28.8 
Switzerland 12.37444 12.37444 12.34858 12.34858 12.34858 12.34858 12.34858 
Cyprus 0 7.5 10 10 10 10 10 
Spain 18 18 15 15 13 10 10 
France 19.85139 19.85139 21.7512 21.7512 21.7512 18.93 18.93 
UK 0 0 13 11 10 10 7 
Hungary 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 4.5 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 6.25 6.25 6.25 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 13.9064 
Luxembourg 22.96 22.96 23.38 23.38 23.38 23.38 21.24 
Malta 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Netherlands 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 





Table E: Effective tax rates in Europe 
In the following table the different tax rates applicable on patent income has been given. The tax 
rates are calculated by including the tax deductions from European tax regimes.  
  Effective tax rate 
 All numbers under are given in percentages 
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Austria 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Belgium 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 5.1 5.1 
Bulgaria 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Switzerland 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 
Cyprus 10 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Czech Rep. 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Germany 30.175 30.175 30.175 30.175 30.175 30.175 30.175 
Denmark 25 25 25 24.5 23.5 22 22 
Estonia 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 
Spain 12 12 15 15 15 15 15 
Finland 26 24.5 24.5 20 20 20 20 
France 16.245 16.245 16.245 16.245 16.245 15.5 15.5 
UK 26 24 10 10 10 10 10 
Greece 20 20 26 26 26 29 29 
Croatia 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 
Hungary 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 4.5 
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 6.25 6.25 6.25 
Italy 31.4 31.29275 31.29275 31.29275 31.29275 31.29275 13.9 
Luxembourg 5.84 5.84 5.84 5.84 5.84 5.84 5.84 
Latvia 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Norway 28 28 28 27 27 25 24 
Poland 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 28.5 31.5 31.5 15.75 15.75 15.75 15.75 
Romania 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Sweden 26.3 26.3 22 22 22 22 22 
Slovenia 20 18 17 17 17 17 19 
Slovakia 19 19 23 22 22 22 21 
 
